Storage before a consent choice
Records observed storage before a visitor makes a choice. A supported advertising-storage match can produce a failed check; unfamiliar names require review.
23 rule types. Three areas. Recorded evidence, clear limits and links to the official rules behind the checks.
The free scan visits up to five public pages. Separate browser sessions help keep an old consent choice from contaminating a fresh test.
We record supported interactions, storage, external requests and available page evidence. Time limits, blocked pages and unfamiliar interfaces can restrict what is observed. We do not log in, buy products or send messages through forms or chatbots.
Ten rule types examine visible controls and supported browser behaviour. Purpose and exceptions still matter.
UK: PECR regulation 6. EU: national rules implementing ePrivacy Article 5(3), alongside relevant GDPR consent requirements. Country-specific exceptions are not exhaustively tested.
Records observed storage before a visitor makes a choice. A supported advertising-storage match can produce a failed check; unfamiliar names require review.
Attempts a supported Reject control and inspects the resulting storage activity. An unsupported or incomplete interaction is not counted as a pass.
Looks for a recognisable Reject or Necessary Only option. Failure to locate it automatically creates a warning, not proof that the option is absent.
Checks whether Accept and Reject are visible and supported interactions complete. Colour, prominence, wording and real usability still need visual review.
The current scanner does not verify the default state of every granular preference category. A suitable preference-panel test needs manual review.
Looks for a cookie-settings or consent link. It does not complete an end-to-end withdrawal test, so a visible link is not a verified withdrawal pass.
Lists recognised technologies for comparison with policy wording. It does not certify the accuracy of purposes, providers or retention periods.
Records frames present before consent. An iframe or external request alone does not establish unlawful tracking.
Checks observed storage after rejection and reload. A supported failure needs recorded evidence; a blocked or failed reload remains untested.
Looks at the consent interface after reload. Its disappearance alone does not prove that preferences persist correctly across all visits.
Seven rule types distinguish a public contact route from the internal process that has to follow it.
UK: Data Protection Act 2018, section 164A, as inserted by the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025. This specific UK complaints duty must not be presented as an identical EU-wide rule.
Looks for contact details on discovered privacy-related pages. It does not establish who reads the inbox or their responsibilities.
Looks for privacy-complaint wording and an electronic contact route. It never sends a test complaint.
Checks the discoverability of complaint information within the pages reached. A route elsewhere on the site may be missed.
Public browsing cannot verify acknowledgement within 30 days. Any owner answer is self-reported, not observed proof.
The scanner cannot inspect your internal investigation process. A responsible person must confirm the arrangements.
Public checks cannot establish whether you communicate complaint outcomes. This needs an operational review.
Identifies visible electronic contact alongside privacy-complaint wording. Message delivery and handling are not tested.
Six rule types flag visible signals and questions for investigation. This is not an automated AI compliance audit.
EU AI Act: Articles 2 and 50. Territorial scope, the type of system and provider/deployer roles determine which duties apply. Personal-data processing also needs a separate GDPR assessment.
Looks for chat vendors and visible AI references. A widget can be human-operated or scripted, and no detected signal does not prove no AI is used.
Records visible AI wording. The scanner does not open or message the widget, so first-interaction timing and adequacy require review.
Whether an interface misleadingly presents AI as a person requires contextual assessment. No conclusion is inferred from the vendor name.
Looks for AI or chatbot references in discovered privacy information. Actual processing, completeness and accuracy require confirmation.
Actual functionality, EU scope and provider/deployer responsibilities need assessment. A UK address alone does not establish applicability.
The scan cannot identify every synthetic item or verify public-interest editorial workflows. It does not certify deepfake or AI-content compliance.
The score summarises assessed rule types, not the percentage of GDPR laws you comply with. Repeated checks across pages count once, using the least reassuring assessed result.
We average the assessed points. If any rule fails, the total is capped at 59 and labelled “Needs fixing”, so other passes cannot hide the failure. With no failures, 85–100 is “Good” and 65–84 is “Fair”. A scan with no assessed rules has no numerical score. Coverage is shown separately.
Example: seven passed rules and six warnings produce 86/100. That is a useful starting point, not a compliance certificate. Report counts can include repeated page findings, so they may differ from the distinct rule count used for the score.
Private account areas, server-side processing, full fingerprinting coverage, all storage mechanisms, every national exception, actual retention practices, international-transfer contracts, security posture and internal complaint handling are not conclusively tested. A privacy-policy link does not prove the policy is accurate.
Our paid service adds manual investigation and agreed technical fixes. The scope is confirmed before payment; it does not guarantee every aspect of legal compliance.
Full testing limitations →